

## **Market Rule Amendment Proposal**

### PART 1 – MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identification No.: MR-00219-R00				
Subject: Outage Coordination				
Title: Arranging Replacement Energy to Support Planned Outages				
<b>Nature of proposal</b> (please indicate with X):	AlterationDeletion _X_Addition			
Chapter: 5	Appendix:			
Sections: 6.3				
Sub-sections proposed for amending: 6.3.6 – 6.3.10 (new)				

Version	Reason for Issuing	Version Date
1.0	Submitted to Technical Panel for Review	February 21, 2003
2.0	Submitted for Technical Panel Vote	March 10, 2003
3.0	Submitted for Technical Panel Review	March 28, 2003
4.0	Submitted for Technical Panel Vote	April 17, 2003
5.0	Recommended by Technical Panel (TP 124) and Submitted for Board Approval	April 22, 2003
6.0	Approved by IMO Board	May 2, 2003

Approved Amendment Publication Date: 7 May 2003

**Approved Amendment Effective Date: 4 June 2003** 

### PART 3 – EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the IMO-administered markets if the amendment is not made
- Alternative solutions considered
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the IMO-administered markets

Planned outages of facilities and equipment are needed to perform necessary, and in some cases, regulatory maintenance and to maintain the reliability of the facilities in question. Since market start the IMO has rejected some outage requests for overall adequacy reasons in accordance with the Market Rules.

The denial of certain planned outages can subsequently result in the forced outages of some of these facilities. Forced outages have a negative impact on the reliability of the IMO-Controlled Grid (sudden loss of generation or transmission facilities or equipment), operation of the IMO-administered markets (price volatility), as well as result in higher costs to participants in having to do maintenance on an unplanned basis. Due to the forecast tight supply situation in Ontario, as indicated in the current IMO quarterly 18-month outlook, rejection of outages at certain times for adequacy reasons is expected to continue. The negative impacts on reliability and the markets noted above would, as a result, continue and potentially grow worse.

The market rules should authorize and enable the ability for generator market participants to arrange imports as replacement capacity or energy to support generator facility outages, with sufficient safeguards to minimize potential adverse impacts on reliability and the market. Supporting outages through provision of replacement capacity or energy benefits market participants. This mechanism will provide an opportunity for a market participant to gain approval of a planned outage that would otherwise be rejected. This mechanism is not intended to disadvantage the planned outage requests made by generators that have no replacement energy associated with them. In turn, this can provide benefits to other market participants by enhancing overall IMO-controlled grid reliability. With this mechanism available, it is less likely that generation units will have outages rejected, revoked or recalled and then be forced out of service. A reduction in the instances of forced outages and the resulting reliability impacts would also assist the IMO in meeting its obligations to maintain reliable operation of the IMO-controlled grid.

A summary of the key elements of the proposed market rule amendments contained within Part 4 of this document are as follows:

- Section 6.3.6 articulates the voluntary nature of the replacement energy to support planned outages program, identifies the replacement energy as an import and establishes the deadlines for the market participant to notify the IMO of the generator's intention. These timelines are necessary in order to allow the IMO sufficient time to evaluate the outage request and the replacement energy mechanism:
- Section 6.3.7 establishes the generator's obligation to provide specific information when the planned outage request is made;
- Section 6.3.7.1 introduces the generator's identification of the intertie zone or zones through which the replacement energy would be scheduled;
- Section 6.3.7.2 requires the generator to identify to the IMO who shall be scheduling the

### PART 3 – EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT

replacement energy at the interties on their behalf and articulates that this party shall be subject to the intertie transaction compliance rules. The IMO shall not take action where failures occur beyond the control of the market participant, however, exemptions from enforcement specified in the guidelines on Intertie Transactions on 'economic grounds' will not be applied to the replacement energy program.

- Section 6.3.8 IMO retains the right to limit this program, as is deemed necessary to maintain the reliable operation of the IMO-controlled grid and articulates the existing time stamp precedence is used to determine the precedence of outages;
- Section 6.3.9 clarifies the IMO may define what amount of replacement energy is necessary for the approval of the planned outage request and the duration of the replacement energy offers;
- Section 6.3.10 failure by the boundary entity to submit offers shall, if the failure is determined to be an event of non-compliance, the generator shall be subject to the formula based penalties under the provisions of section 6.6.8 of Chapter 3.

#### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

### Replacement Energy to Support Planned Outages

- 6.3.6 A generator may, no later than the time specified in section 6.4.1, in requesting a planned outage in accordance with section 6.3.1, notify the IMO that the generator shall arrange replacement energy offers in the form of an import to support the outage request. A generator may, when requesting an extension to an outage under section 6.4.7 or rescheduling an outage under section 6.4.10, notify the IMO that the generator shall arrange replacement energy offers in the form of an import to support the outage extension or re-scheduling request. For certainty, this section shall not under any circumstances impose any explicit or implicit obligation on either a generator to so notify the IMO, or if so notified, the IMO to approve or accept any such arrangement. Upon notice to the IMO, a generator may withdraw the arrangement for replacement energy offers at any time up to final approval of the outage or up to the final approval of the extension to or rescheduling of the outage.
- 6.3.7 The *generator* shall provide the following information to the *IMO* when in accordance with section 6.3.6 it either submits a *planned outage* request or requests the extension to or rescheduling of an *outage*:
  - 6.3.7.1 Subject to the approval of the *IMO*, the *intertie* zone or zones through which the replacement *energy* is intended to be scheduled; and,

<ul> <li>6.3.8 The <i>IMO</i> may limit the number and aggregate size of <i>outages</i> supported by replacement <i>energy</i> and, where the number and aggregate size of <i>outages</i> is limited the <i>IMO</i> shall determine the precedence of the <i>outages</i>, in accordance with sections 6.4.13 through 6.4.18.</li> <li>6.3.9 The <i>IMO</i> may specify and inform the <i>generator</i> of the minimum amount of replacement <i>energy</i> in megawatts and the duration of <i>offers</i> necessary to sup the <i>planned outage</i> request or the request for the extension to or rescheduling the <i>outage</i>.</li> <li>6.3.10 If the <i>registered market participant</i> associated with a <i>registered facility</i> that <i>boundary entity</i> referred to in section 6.3.7.2 fails to submit <i>offers</i> for the replacement <i>energy</i>, that have been arranged by the <i>generator</i>, the <i>generator</i> be subject to the financial penalties calculated in accordance with the provisit of section 6.6.8 of Chapter 3.</li> </ul>
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RT 5 – IMO BOARD COMMENTS



# **Market Rule Amendment Proposal**

### PART 1 – MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identification No.: MR-00219-R01		
Subject: Outage Coordination		
Title: Arranging Replacement Energy to Support Planned Outages - Compliance		
Nature of proposal (please indicate with X): Alteration DeletionX Addition		
Chapter.3	Appendix:3.1	
Sections:		
Sub-sections proposed for amending:		

Reason for Issuing	Version Date
	Reason for Issuing

**Approved Amendment** *Publication* **Date:** 

**Approved Amendment Effective Date:** 

### PART 3 – EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT

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Consequential to the proposed market rule amendments in MR-00219-R00 there is a need to articulate, in Appendix 3.1 of the market rules, how the formula based penalty in Chapter 3 section 6.6.8 would be applied to an event of non-compliance pursuant to Chapter 5 section 6.3.10.

The formula is  $P = D \times T \times C$ . P is the amount of the financial penalty in dollars. D would be the deviation, including not making the offer at all, from the replacement energy offer expressed in MW only if the deviation is negative relative to the amount which the generator had agreed to offer in support of the planned outage. T represents the duration of the breach, expressed in hours or fraction of hours. C would be equal to the market clearing price (MCP) multiplied by an amount to be determined by the IMO in accordance with section 6.6.9 of Chapter 3.

### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Chapter 5, section 6.3.10	Formula based penalty as per section 6.6.8 where:
	D = the amount by which the <i>offer</i> made is less than the MW which the <i>generator</i> had agreed would be <i>offered</i> in support of the <i>planned</i> outage or the extension to or rescheduling of an outage.  C = market price x amount to be determined by the <i>IMO</i> under section 6.6.9

PART 5 – IMO BOARD COMMENTS							