

## Market Rule Amendment Proposal

### PART 1 - MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identification No.:		MR-00374					
Subject:	Congestion Management Settlement Credits (CMSC)						
Title:	Replacing the Temporary Suspension of CMSC for Constrained-Off Dispatchable Loads						
Nature of Proposal:		Alteration	Alteration			Addition	
Chapter:	9			Appendix:			
Sections:	3.5.1C (deleted), 3.5.1D (new), 3.5.2						
Sub-sections proposed for amending:							

## PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY

Version	Reason for Issuing		Version Date		
1.0	Draft for Technical Panel	l review	October 18, 2010		
2.0	Publish for Stakeholder F	Review and Comment	October 21, 2010		
3.0	Submitted for Technical Board Approval	Panel Vote and IESO	November 1, 2010		
4.0	Recommended by Techn	ical Panel	November 10, 2010		
5.0	Approved by IESO Board	d	November 11, 2010		
Approved Ame	ndment Publication Date:	November 11, 2010			
Approved Ame	ndment Effective Date:	December 3, 2010			

### PART 3 – EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### Summary

It is proposed that dispatchable loads will not be entitled to constrained off CMSC payments related to ramping, where such payments are caused by conditions and/or actions at the load facility, and not by conditions on the IESO-controlled grid.

This proposal will replace the temporary suspension on energy-related CMSC for all constrained-off dispatchable load facilities that was introduced under urgent rule amendment MR-00373<sup>1</sup>.

### Background

Refer to MR-00374-Q00.

#### Discussion

Amend the market rules in Chapter 9, section 3.5 to specify that a market participant for a dispatchable load shall not be entitled to constrained off CMSC where there is a price-quantity change in the energy bid associated with the dispatchable load and that change results in:

- a change in the quantity scheduled in the market schedule; and
- the ramping up or down of the dispatchable load.

The first condition, i.e. the change in the energy bid, indicates a dispatchable load's desire to change its operating behaviour as a result of conditions and/or actions at the load facility and not due to conditions on the IESO-controlled grid. The second and third conditions ensure the withholding of constrained-off CMSC is limited to bid changes that result in changes to the facility's market schedule and targets constrained off CMSC that is a result of the dispatchable load ramping up or down.

The decision rules that will be used to determine whether the above conditions hold will be specified in the applicable settlements market manual.

As a matter of clean-up, a missing cross reference to section 3.5.1A (constrained-off dispatch deviations added in 2003) will be made in section 3.5.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/mr2010/MR\_00373-R00.pdf

## PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

# **Chapter 9**

# 3.5 Hourly Settlement Amounts for Congestion Management

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- 3.5.1C Notwithstanding any other provision in the *market rules*, a *registered market participant* for a *constrained off dispatchable load* shall not be eligible for any congestion management *settlement* credit payments attributable to a constraint on the withdrawal of *energy*. This section shall cease to have effect on March 31, 2011, or such earlier or later date as the *IESO Board* may determine with such date to be *published* by the *IESO*.[Intentionally left blank section deleted]
- 3.5.1D A registered market participant for a constrained off dispatchable load shall not be entitled to a congestion management *settlement* credit determined in accordance with section 3.5.2 for hour 'h,' where:
  - 3.5.1D.1 the price-quantity pairs contained in the energy bid associated with the dispatchable load for hour 'h' are not identical to the price-quantity pairs in the energy bid associated with the same dispatchable load for the applicable preceding hour or following hour; and
  - 3.5.1D.2 the change in *energy bid* as referred to in section 3.5.1D.1 results in a change in the quantity scheduled in the *market schedule* for that *dispatchable load* as described in the applicable *market manual*; and
  - 3.5.1D.3 the change in *energy bid* as referred to in section 3.5.1D.1 results in the ramping of the *dispatchable load* as described in the applicable *market manual.*
- 3.5.2 Subject to sections <u>3.5.1A</u>, <u>3.5.1D</u>, <u>3.5.6</u>, <u>3.5.7</u> and <u>3.5.9</u> and subject to Appendix 7.6 of Chapter 7, the hourly congestion *management settlement credit* for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' ("CMSC<sub>k,h</sub>") shall be determined by the following equation:

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## PART 5 – IESO BOARD DECISION RATIONALE

This proposal replaces the temporary suspension of CMSC for constrained-off dispatchable load facilities that was implemented under urgent rule amendment MR-00373.